Why Iceland Voted No
In the past days, we have witnessed Iceland, by the narrowest of margins, reject continuing negotiations with the European Union on membership. The results were 105,339 for Continuation and 118,040 to continue the pause on further negotiations.1 Articles today will highlight that this victory for ‘Euroscepticism’ comes amid questions about Danish control over neighbouring Greenland from the United States. Another concern is that Iceland lacks an Armed Force and the United States has withdrawn as a reliable partner for defence.2
This, however, is not a rejection of Europe. It is a sign of the times, both for those in Europe and in Iceland, that the status quo relationship will be preserved. Iceland’s sovereignty in key matters such as defence, the economy, and the cost of living will be maintained.
However, one issue that has taken a back seat to the question of defence is Fishing .It is, in my opinion, the most important issue in this election, as it is an important part of Iceland’s socioeconomic success as well as an important pillar in recent history. I will explain both the history behind Iceland’s fishing industry and the infamous ‘Cod Wars’, and the implications of this ‘No’ result. I shall also highlight what the results could spell for both Europe and Iceland.
Fishing has always been important to the economy and people of Iceland, making up 38.9% of foreign exports and 8% of its GDP.3 From early settlements to the present day, fishing has been an important staple for its exports and for the livelihoods of its people. Herring and Cod both became important economic exports of Iceland in the 20th century, leading to Iceland’s first real taste of conflict for an Armyless nation. In the aftermath of the Second World War, the concept of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) – which allowed a country sole rights to exploit aquacultural and mineral deposits in its waters – developed and was adopted by several countries. Iceland’s EEZ was extended first to 4 nautical miles in 1952 and later 12 nautical miles by 1958, although it's important to note all of these decisions came unilaterally from the Icelandic side.4
In the late 1950’s however, British fishers contested this unilateral decision and, with support from the Royal Navy, continued to fish in Icelandic waters, sparking domestic fears of overfishing and the erosion of the island’s sovereignty. Iceland deployed her coast guard, and by 1961 the conflict was solved at the negotiation table. In the early 1970s Iceland once again extended its EEZ to 50 nautical miles, which sparked the conflict once again; this time, however, Britain was joined by Germany in skirmishes.5
In the late 1970’s Iceland’s government decided to once again extend its EEZ, this time to 200 nautical miles. Once again,Britain deployed its Royal Navy to protect fishermen who had been hassled and attacked by the Icelandic Coast Guard. Brought to the negotiations table in Oslo in 1976, the negotiations ended with Britain recognizing the 200 nautical mile limit of the EEZ. In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea created a globally recognized nautical mile limit for any nation’s Exclusive Economic Zones as a direct result of this conflict. Iceland has sacrificed heavily to maintain its cultural, economic and historical attachment to fishing by fighting both in its waters and on the negotiating table.
Fishing has thus become an important symbol for Icelandic sovereignty. The Cod Wars may be seen as an economic win, but it is also a political symbol of the triumph of legalism in oceanic waters and of Icelandic sovereignty.
Iceland has been a partner of the EU since joining the European Economic Area in 1994, which brought Iceland “into the single market… [and enabled] free movement of people, services, goods and capital”6 within the European Union. Iceland has also been a member of the Schengen Area since 2001. Before 2026’s referendum, Iceland had previously been in negotiations to join the European Union from 2009 to 2013, when negotiations were suspended by the Icelandic Government.
If Iceland had continued negotiations with the EU and had ascended into the EU, they would have become a member of the Common Fisheries Policy.7 Membership would have meant that Iceland would surrender several key decision-making processes to EU institutions, such as control over fishery management and the Total Allowable Catch or TAC (amount of fish allowed to be caught).8 Membership also would have resulted in greater access for European fleets to Icelandic waters. The precise nature of any such agreement, however, would still be up to negotiations; the suggestion that fishing policy would be out of the hands of Icelandic fishermen and lawmakers seems to have been enough to stall further negotiations.
The argument presented by lawmakers in favour of Iceland joining the EU revolved around both the economy and defence. This argument focused on stemming the high inflation and interest rates in recent years, as well as the relief that a conversion to the Euro could bring to the volatile Icelandic Krona.9;10 Another argument in favour was that closer ties to the European Union could help alleviate security concerns over a more aggressive Russia and America in the Arctic region and help defend the sovereignty of Iceland.
The stark geographic divide between the two ‘Yes’ voting central Reykjavik constituencies and the ‘No’ voting suburban and rural constituencies of the rest of the country show a clear divide between those more dependent on fishing and agriculture as a way of life. These dependent communities would have surrendered several policy decisions over to Brussels had Iceland voted to continue negotiations and then later join the EU.
Domestically, the political fallout of the result seems minor. Although there was a divide within the Valkyrie Coalition over what outcome would be the most favourable, the government remains stable, and the Prime Minister has not ruled out another referendum in the future. This result seems unlikely to trigger a significant change both in the government of Iceland or in their relationship with the EU.
With the results and the entangled history between Fishing and Iceland, there come to be several questions on the results. Mainly, ‘what does this victory mean for the EU?’, and, ‘is this a very serious blow for the EU?’. Firstly, any sentiment that the EU is losing out is overstated, as demonstrated by the continual membership of Iceland in EU-backed programs like Schengen, the EEA, and its Joint-Parliamentary Committees and cooperation on defence within NATO.11 Iceland has not abandoned the EU, nor is it ignoring it; rather, it is content with its present arrangement, which preserves its sovereignty over its domestic issues but keeps economic and political ties open with the EU. However, the fact that a close European partner in Iceland has rejected a closer relationship highlights that perhaps the EU should take a more detailed look into amending its membership process. After all, the EU has seen no further membership since Croatia in 2013.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this result are that Iceland’s electorate has chosen to prioritize its present agreement, oceanic sovereignty, and its historic and present economic reliance on fishing rather than cultivating a connection with Europe. This might not be a disastrous sacrifice, as the historic precedent of the EU membership process seems likely to stall once more, as it has with Turkey, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia,12 and potentially might not result in the potential fruits of membership. More importantly, it implies to Europe that its attempts to wrangle aligned powers into its bloc have been unsuccessful, as it is tainted by complexity. This complexity comes from both issues with membership (as highlighted above), but also in its policies like the CFP and CAP, which bring anxiety from both countries outside and inside the Union. The legal lesson to take from Iceland is that, on such geopolitical questions, countries should not overlook minor issues pertaining to decades-old agreements. The EU must reflect on the dangers of a byzantine system bogging down the expansion, credibility and attractiveness of their Union. This is not a triumph of the ‘Eurosceptics’ as many on the continent would seek to brand it; rather, it could be seen as a victory for those in Iceland who argue that their present arrangements suffice. The facts of the matter are that Iceland remains happy with its arrangement in Schengen, in the EEA, and within the channels of dialogue which do not entail giving up elements of its control over deeply rooted domestic issues. This could also be seen as a triumph for the internal reformers within the EU wanting to streamline the membership system and other internal issues to help alleviate the concerns which this referendum result has brought to light in the public conscience.
Whatever Iceland's future relationship with the EU comes to be, it shall remain defined by its past relationship with its sovereignty. Fishing seems to have been the main issue which the No campaign masterfully highlighted, resulting in their victory. The lesson of Iceland remains not to ignore the historic precedent which often defines these relations. It is also a reminder to those within the EU that their union is less attractive than it once was, having been defined by Brexit, the Eurocrisis, and members whose agendas line directly against the interests of Europe. Both Iceland and Europe will reflect on the implications of the results and I earnestly hope Europe takes this as not a defeat but rather a sign of the times; the surrendering of sovereignty is now a more worrisome issue for minor nations in the age of Trump, and a cutback to the union’s byzantine nature can give the alliance a breath of fresh air.
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